

The ~~Geography~~^{Topography} of Policy in the 1960's

At any one time, some aspects of international situation ~~are~~ seem less uncertain than others, & less likely to change; basis for agreement; the "constants, data, assumptions" of policy.

familiar landscape

cliffs, impassable barriers

We act as if the forbidding features of the landscape were as dear to us as the highways.

1) General inertia, against change of maps

Intertwined; vested interests (to rule out one policy is to favor another).

2) Tendency to regard present policy as "good," "best available," "only one possible."

To see flaws and risks, and to see alternatives, is to create problems.

"Decision to go to the Moon" — not Truman's problem

US monopoly of strategic nuclear
SU monopoly of ground forces

"Nuclears are on our side"

("equalizer of population, ground forces")

But really, equalizer of industrial capacity,
among major powers (US-SU)

("advantage to defense": but not on ...)

"We have nothing but nuclears."

"SU has overwhelmingly large forces."

"SU has the air superiority."

"SU has advantage of interior lines worldwide."

Reasons to change map: 1) Change in environment

2) Movement from "future" into "present"

(Security concerns features of present from
public; + public discussion of budgets + long-range
policies focuses on the future. So public may
never share the reduction in uncertainty about the present:
glimpses show a world very different from the one
forecast earlier, and the one present now: with
different uncertainties.

Facts on Strategic ^{Nuc}Nuclear War:

- 0) Nuc War is a possibility.
- 1) The range of possible consequences is vast:
the circumstances of ^{preparation,} initiation, conduct, and
termination make a very great difference.
- 2) The best outcome is bad, & risky.
- 3) The worst is quite possible, and is horrible.

Hence, policy-makers must:

Factors of geography:

SU forces: Must be concerned with the possibility that they might use the forces they ^{+ clearly will have} have, against our interests

- a) way they say + plan to use them
- b) way that would be ~~best~~ good for them
- c) worst for us.

Allied forces

Possible redeployment

vs. comparison of divisions (false geography):

we can redploy or reorganize div
(comparison of mil. manpower, etc. may overstate our present strength, though latter represent potential).

cadre
overstated
misleading: firepower, etc
mobilization ^{file} allies
(don't compare SU mobilized strength with allies' ready strength).

(Compare SU strength in East G. with W in West G - to show difference in divisions: not true that it is all in "overhead.")

less attention to non-nuclear factors in part
because they "weighed less" in balance.

Even then, this forced ~~to~~ consecutive goals on
us (Hungary, Berlin...

"unthinkable" to intervene

SU threat against Europe: both vital, & strike first:
latter too risky then, and still is

But former now raises question: Can we expect
use of tac. nuc. to be unilateral? In ~~mid~~ early
'50's, yes: because of ^{our} monopoly; later, yes, because of
SAC near-monopoly. Now?

Can we hope for ~~to~~ SU vital. to be strictly limited?

X Confusion over ~~the~~ term "first strike." (little
difference if: a) main SAC bases in Europe
or b) strike vs. Europe alone, "impossible."

We have said we would use nuc.... but have not
spelled out when we would use SAC.

(e.g. SU nuc. attack on ~~the~~ NATO nuc. weapons.)

Distinguish "facts" of present capabilities which
3) are subject to our control and which can be
changed from those which

b) can be changed, but are ~~not~~ subject
partial or total ^{by others} to our control (Allies; SU)

c) can't/won't change — in short or mid-term.
or can't be controlled by major powers.

e.g. This is a fact that ~~we~~ NATO is vulnerable
today ^{to} from non-nuclear attack from ready
SU forces: indeed, from SU forces in E. Germany
alone. But ⁽³⁶⁾ not because...

But US alone cannot ~~change~~ change this (cat. (b))

Improvement worldwide is in our ability: mobility, etc. (2)

(c): SU strat. & tac nuc capability.

Non-Com
~~Western~~ logistic advantage in SE Asia...

~~36~~ Poss. of non-nuclear war...

(b) SU forces: set dimensions to our problems.

China + SU

Start with security problem posed by
SU ground forces ^{including the ones}: the forces they maintain
and could most readily be used to support &
carry out threats worldwide.

What is our capability if these forces should
be threatened or used?

(In ~~the~~ nearly all crises, it will be more
plausible that such forces will be involved than
that SU will initiate ~~with~~ strat. moves

Evaluate: a) Prob. of detering use

b) Ability to counter, if used.

c) effect of prospect of use - + - counter ^{planned}
on Alliances in crisis.

(Might their use be threatened,
demonstrated?)

Are they a problem to us? Is a limited war
"impossible" — given present + reasonably possible SU regime
in ~~present~~ possible crises?

Asymmetry in present situation:

US ~~attack~~ counter-military attacks could significantly lower damage SU could inflict (while retaining threat); (esp. with US CS)

SU could not.

However, ~~the~~ damage SU could inflict, both before & after US strike, would probably be high (assuming period of tension, probable hostilities, alert: US action otherwise can be ruled out).

Spill out: ~~THEY~~ ^{with certainty} The Sovs could, bring an attack by SAC on them in ways other than a direct attack on US cities or SAC bases: e.g. ^{now} an attack on NATO nuclear capability or cities.

[caution: don't suggest this is change in US policy: e.g. that ^{now} attack on NATO non-nuc forces would not be covered by SAC; "SAC attack ~~is~~ ^{is} rel. less follow a lesser SU assault, & would if necessary."

US will not commit aggression; but ^{SU} aggression against US Allies is not safe from retali. by US strat. forces. However.

Our ability to deal with ~~SD~~ Bloc non-nuc
or ~~the same~~ aggression worldwide is not
limited to our ability to counter with nucs:
fortunately.

SU has cut down non-nuc; NATO + US have
built up; "logistic factors" work against Bloc in many
places, & US ability is increasing; in power terms,
already rough parity; these air factors

Fortunate because: SU growth in strat & nuc
nuc makes nuc war bilateral (this fact is more
permanent, & of broader significance, than
arguments should not obscure this fact.
controversial issues of "degree of asymmetry or
"superiority" — though significant asymmetries do exist
e.g. longer. limiting, flexibility, control — hard to
equate to "superiority," because some of their weaknesses
& rigidities would work against both interests in war,
rather than clearly favoring us. e.g. their large
warheads in Europe. C & C?

1) Asymmetries of bilateral war; probable high danger + risk of
nuc war: c) ~~asymmetries~~ Dispersions, dissolution in crisis.

Major "data" ; Major problems ^{which require forces} for an part of the answer.
Major criteria for size of forces;

a)
Choices of : Views of the world; problems, possibilities

b) Broad criteria, objectives

(for non-nuc forces : size
mobility
deployment
air support

for tac nucs

for strat nucs

for proposed Alliance posture
(we don't "choose" this).

(Can't design forces in keeping with non-crisis
atmosphere : must reduce prob. of crises, reduce effect
of them, deal with rise of threat or threat of actual
Bloc military capabilities by Bloc leaders less cautious
than current ones — who, if they were prudent enough
to remove missiles from Cuba, were not prudent enough to
have refrained from putting them in. Antabehn.

In such showdown situations — which can be brought about by third parties — it is actual SO strengths at the hand of actual US leaders that determine the ~~promise~~ the promise of the use of actual Western strength, & the cohesion & resolution of Western Alliances.

~~To have overestimated those strengths earlier~~

To ~~have~~ overestimate those strengths in crisis is obviously dangerous. To have overestimated them in earlier forecasts can be just as dangerous; for it may have made some potential improvements look impossible, or far too costly

(~~Ch~~ I: p. 17)

"The Battle is the Payoff"

The Crisis is the Payoff" — & images then count

On our side, image is more closely linked to reality: more publicized; yet even here, notion of Western strength can be

Non-nuc war could be bilateral (NATO could
face confront SU with this!)

SU needs "more than shoes" to march to Canal;
even if we did not use nucs; (don't encourage
them to gamble on non-use of nucs by Alliance or
by any one Ally).

Bilateral nature of nuc war means that
initiation will remain fateful acts — even in context
of non-nuc war — and no steps short of
irresponsible sacrifice of high-level control could
make it look automatic to opponent in face of
~~the~~ aggression at less than the highest levels.

Nucs alone can make non-nuc attack look
a risky gamble, ~~but~~ (risk depending on size: too big,
in part, for large attack, but not for small) but not
a certainty of defeat.

There

Compare situation in 1963 with that in 1950 and
+ 1960 (see West German)
1953: troops, organization, tac air, tac nucs,
strat nucs.

Earlier: that war or the war would be unilateral;
non-muc war would also be unilateral

That was: facts

That war would be bilateral; F

The war would probably be bilateral (about
certainly, it ~~is~~ levels above lowest known war);

Non-muc war could be bilateral

New strengths of what and of Soviet force
choices upon us: SU has ~~now~~ power now to null
~~Old~~ policies look less safe, new ones

Salient facts on that war: as possible

C-F damage-limiting not really a "problem" for SU

Note: cover all SU ~~and~~ urgent mil. targets?
(force & harder, limit damage)

Criteria: Pt I: p. 15, 32, 33

Limits on damage-limiting: SU "hard core"

SU Crisis posture

(SU doctrine, C & C)

(not force size)

(insensitive beyond
proposed levels).

US CO: AD 1

(Note SU back-up missiles?)

Describe: Minimum criteria of non-mc forces in Europe

Use against contingencies

Possible goals against major assault

Strat forces:

Control, selective targeting, residual forces become more important - determining outcome (along with CD; AD?) than more offensive forces.

Consequences of war continue to worsen.

Battlefield issues: difficulty of political decision, prospect of escalation; likelihood of low asymmetrical response; doctrine, larger yield, longer range weapons; aircraft.

important option:

Creates uncertainties for SU; insurance against large surprise attack, or unexpectedly large build-up after strong attack after buildup.

Mass are "equivalent" between SU + NATO :

Asymmetries:	NATO	Pact
GDP	> 800 B (1955 dollars)	~ 300 B

Pop	890 m	320 m
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Armed forces	about 6 mill.	~ 4.3 mill
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Uncertainties: weight of SU cadre divs

SU too air

SU buildup — e.g. in response to NATO

So not SU (80) divs: 30 14-day + 25-30 reserve

Tac nuc: favor the defense?

damage levels low?

Could favor offense; concentrations of energy;
superlative instruments for surprise + offensive
breakthroughs [then, for tactical defense of
"alerted" SC troops?]

Wipe out advantages of industrial power, not of
manpower.

spectrum of conflict

H.B.

84
~~85~~. 14

p. 1

I think myself this is a monstrous bracket.
Both changes, logically, could be correct (and
indeed I believe both will be correct in '65 Budgets).
... (I also think it unnecessary to attack our
friend George McGovern).

p. 3: I don't. And missing almost entirely, on both sides, was
the complexity of what we now impressively call the tactical
nuclear weapon. The reason for this is that, in my judgment,
we expose our flanks to de Gaulle & Strauss if we do not ourselves
show full appreciation of the importance as well as the limitations of ^{these} weapons.

14: I'd strike this sentence because it suggests a goal
we are not going to reach and should no longer
preach: complete conventional parity on the Central
Front. The next paragraph says, quite rightly, that
we don't need such parity, and this is a much better
line.

Now.

It is a very good speech now. But I think
it has two